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Abstract We investigate the connection between the entropy of equilibrium measures and
game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators in a multi-channel dynamical system. Specif-
ically, we show that the existence of an equilibrium measure, which maximizes the free
energy (i.e., the sum of the entropy and the integral over a potential), is related to an equi-
librium or “maximum entropy” state for the multi-channel dynamical system that is com-
posed with a set of feedback operators. Further, we observe that such a connection makes
sense when this set of feedback operators strategically interacts over an infinite-horizon, in
a game-theoretic sense, using the current state-information of the system. Finally, we briefly
comment on the implication of our result to the resilient behavior of the equilibrium feed-
back operators, when there is a random perturbation in the system.
Keywords Equilibrium feedback operators · entropy of equilibrium measures · game
theory · maximum entropy · multi-channel dynamical system · resilient behavior
1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper (which is a continuation of our previous paper [3]) is to
draw a connection between the entropy of equilibrium measures and game-theoretic equi-
librium feedback operators in multi-channel dynamical systems. We first specify a game in
a strategic form over an infinite-horizon – where, in the course of the game, each feedback
operator generates a feedback control in response to the action of other feedback operators
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through the system (i.e., using the current state-information of the system) and, similarly,
any number of feedback operators can decide on to play their feedback strategies simultane-
ously. However, each of these feedback operators are expected to respond in some sense of
best-response correspondence to the strategies of the other feedback operators in the system.
In such a scenario, it is well known that the notion of game-theoretic equilibrium will offer a
suitable framework to study or characterize the robust property of all equilibrium solutions
under a family of information structures – since no one can improve his payoff by deviating
unilaterally from this strategy once the equilibrium strategy is attained (e.g., see [2] or [14]
on the notions of optimums and strategic equilibria in games).
In view of the above arguments, we present in this paper a game-theoretic formalism –
where the criterion is to maximize the free energy (i.e., the sum of the entropy and the inte-
gral over potential) for the multi-channel dynamical system, which is composed with a set of
feedback operators. Such a formalism is an intuitive for establishing a connection between
the existence of an equilibrium measure that is related to the equilibrium or “maximum en-
tropy” state for dynamical systems (e.g., see also [16], [18] or [8] for a detailed exposition of
equilibrium states for dynamical systems), and a set of feedback operators that strategically
interacts over an infinite-horizon using the current state-information of the system. Finally,
we also comment on the implication of our result to the resilient behavior of the equilibrium
feedback operators, when there is a random perturbation in the system. Here, we hasten to
add that such a study, which involves evidence of dynamical systems exhibiting resilient
behavior, would undoubtedly provide a better understanding of reliability versus the degree
of redundancy in large complex systems.1
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide some preliminary results that
are relevant to our paper. In Section 3, we present our main results – where we establish
a connection between the entropy of equilibrium measures and game-theoretic equilibrium
feedback operators in multi-channel dynamical systems. This section also discusses an ex-
tension of the resilient behavior (to these equilibrium feedback operators), when there is a
random perturbation in the system.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 General setting
Consider the following multi-channel dynamical system
x˙(t) = A(t)x(t) +
∑
j∈N
Bj(t)uj(t), x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,+∞), (1)
whereA(·) ∈ Rd×d,Bj(·) ∈ Rd×rj , x(t) ∈ X ⊂ Rd is the state of the system, uj(t) ∈ Uj
is the control input to the jth - channel and N , {1, 2, . . . , N} represents the set of control
input channels (or the set of feedback operators) in the system.
1 In this paper, our intent is to provide a theoretical framework, rather than pointing out a specific numerical
or application problem.
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Moreover, we consider the following class of admissible control strategies that will be useful
in the following section (i.e., in Subsection 3.1 of game-theoretic formalism)
UK ⊆
{
u(t) ∈
∏
j∈N
L
2(R+,R
rj ) ∩ L∞(R+,Rrj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Uj
}
, (2)
where u(t) is given by u(t) =
(
u1(t), u2(t), . . . , uN (t)
)
.
In what follows, suppose there exist feedback operators
(K∗1, K∗2, . . . , K∗N) from a class of
linear operators K : X → UK (i.e., (Kjx)(t) ∈ Uj for j ∈ N ) with strategies
(K∗jx)(t) ∈
Uj for t ≥ t0 and for j ∈ N . Further, let φj
(
t; t0, x0,
(
̂uj(t), u∗¬j(t)
)) ∈ X be the unique
solution of the jth - subsystem
x˙
j(t) =
(
A(t) +
∑
i∈N¬j
Bi(t)K∗i (t)
)
x
j(t) +Bj(t)uj(t), (3)
with an initial condition x0 ∈ X and control inputs given by(
̂uj(t), u∗¬j(t)
)
,
(
u
∗
1(t), u
∗
2(t), . . . , u
∗
j−1(t), uj(t), u
∗
j+1(t), . . . , u
∗
N (t)
) ∈ UK,
(4)
where u∗i (t) = K∗i (t)xj(t) for i ∈ N¬j , N\{j} and j ∈ N .
Furthermore, we may require that the control input for the jth - channel to be uj(t) =(Kjxj)(t) ∈ Uj and with these linear feedback operators(Kj ,K∗¬j) , (K∗1, . . . , K∗j−1, Kj , K∗j+1, . . . , K∗N) ∈ K .
Then, the unique solution φj
(
t; t0, x0,
(
̂uj(t), u∗¬j(t)
))
will take the form
φj
(
t; t0, x0,
(
̂uj(t), u∗¬j(t)
))
= ΦK
∗
¬j (t, t0)Φ
Kj (t, t0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
x0, ∀t ∈ [t0, +∞), (5)
where (with t0 = τ )
∂ΦK
∗
¬j (t, τ)
∂t
=
(
A(t) +
∑
i∈N¬j
Bi(t)K∗i (t)
)
Φ
K∗
¬j (t, τ), (6)
∂ΦKj (t, τ)
∂t
= B∗j (t)Φ
Kj (t, τ), (7)
with both ΦK
∗
¬j (τ, τ) and ΦKj (τ, τ) are identity matrices, and B∗(t) is given by
B
∗
j (t) =
(
Φ
K∗
¬j (t, τ)
)−1
Bj(t)Kj(t)ΦK
∗
¬j (t, τ), (8)
for each j ∈ N (e.g., see [5] for such a decomposition that arises in differential equa-
tions).
In the following, we assume that X is a topological Hausdorff space and A is a σ - algebra
of Borel set, i.e., the smallest σ - algebra which contains all open, and thus closed, subsets of
X . With this, for any t ≥ 0 (assuming that t0 = 0) and (Kj, K∗¬j) ∈ K , we can consider
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a family of continuous measurable mappings (or transformations)
{
Φ
(Kj ,K
∗
¬j
)
t
}
t≥0
on X
satisfying
(R+ ×X) ∋ (t, x) 7→ Φ(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t x ∈ X. (9)
Remark 1 Note that Equation (5) (which corresponds to the jth - subsystem) appeared to be
tractable for the game-theoretic formalism of Subsection 3.1, when any computational effort
is required with respect toKj for j ∈ N , while the othersK∗¬j remain fixed (cf. Definition 2
as well as Footnote 4).
2.2 Entropy of equilibrium measures
In the following, let MΦt
(
X
)
denote the set of all Φ(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t - invariant Borel probability
measures on X with respect to (Kj , K∗¬j) ∈ K . Then, we can introduce the following
definition.
Definition 1 A measure ν ∈ MΦt
(
X
)
is called invariant under the family of measurable
transformations
{
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
}
t≥0
if
ν
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)−1
(A) = ν
(
A
)
, ∀t ≥ 0, (10)
for any Borel set A ∈ A .
Remark 2 Note that, for each fixed t ≥ 0 and (Kj , K∗¬j) ∈ K , the transformation Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
is measurable, i.e., for any Borel set A ∈ A , the set
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)−1
(A) ∈ A is measur-
able, where
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)−1
(A) denotes the set of all x such that Φ(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t x ∈ A (e.g.,
see [13] for invariant measures on topological spaces; see also [17] or [11] on the notion of
entropy for dynamical systems).
Next, we have the following proposition that establishes the existence of an equilibrium state
for a given potential function.
Proposition 1 (Cf. Proposition 3.1 in [10]) The measure µ ∈ MΦt
(
X
)
is called an equi-
librium state for the transformationΦ(Kj,K
∗
¬j
t ), for each fixed t ≥ 0, and a potential function
ϕ ∈ C(X,R) if the following holds2
Pϕ
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
= sup
ν∈MΦt
(
X
)
{
hν
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
ϕdν
}
,
= hµ
(
Φ
(Kj ,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
ϕdµ, (11)
for all j ∈ N , where hµ is the measure-theoretic entropy of Φ(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t .
2 ϕ ∈ C(X,R) is measurable and bounded from above and below.
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Remark 3 We remark that, for each fixed t ≥ 0 and (Kj , K∗¬j) ∈ K , the measure-theoretic
entropy
K ×MΦt
(
X
) ∋ ((Kj , K∗¬j), ν) 7→ hν(Φ(Kj,K∗¬j)t ) ∈ R ∪ {∞},
is upper semicontinuous (see also [4, Lemma 2.3]). Moreover, if the potential ϕ ∈ C(X,R)
is upper semicontinuous, then the free energy functional in Equation (11) is upper semicon-
tinuous too. Note that the measure space MΦt
(
X
)
is compact in the weak topology, this
further ensures the existence of equilibrium states with respect to ϕ ∈ C(X,R).
3 Main Results
3.1 Game-theoretic formalism
In the following, we specify a game in a strategic form over an infinite-horizon – where, in
the course of the game, each feedback operator generates automatically a feedback control
in response to the action of other feedback operators via the system state x(t) for t ∈
[t0, +∞). For example, the jth - feedback operator can generate a feedback control uj(t) =(Kjxj)(t) in response to the actions of other feedback operators u∗i (t) = (K∗i xj)(t) for
i ∈ N¬j , where
(
̂uj(t), u∗¬j(t)
) ∈ UK, and, similarly, any number of feedback operators
can decide on to play feedback strategies simultaneously. Hence, for such a game to have
stable equilibrium solution (which is also robust to small perturbations in the system or
strategies played by others), then each feedback operator is required to respond optimally
(in some sense of best-response correspondence) to the others strategies.
To this end, for a given potential function ϕ ∈ C(X,R), it will be useful to consider the
following criterion function (i.e., the free energy of the dynamical system)3
K ×MΦt
(
X
) ∋ ((Kj , K∗¬j), ν) 7→ Pϕ(Φ(Kj,K∗¬j)t ) ∈ R ∪ {∞}, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ N ,
(12)
over the class of linear feedback operators K (or the class of admissible control functions
UK). Note that, under the game-theoretic formalism, if there exist game-theoretic equilib-
rium feedback operators
(K∗1, K∗2, . . . , K∗N) ∈ K that strategically interact using the cur-
rent state-information of the system. Then, for a given potential ϕ ∈ C(X,R), the problem
that arises from attempting to describe the equilibrium states for the family of measurable
transformations
{
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
}
t≥0
, (Kj, K∗¬j) ∈ K , will also include determining all er-
godic measures that maximize entropy for the multi-channel dynamical system, while the
latter is composed with these equilibrium feedback operators.
Hence, more formally, we have the following definition for the equilibrium feedback opera-
tors (K∗1, K∗2, . . . , K∗N ) ∈ K .
3 Such a criterion function (which is related with the sum of the entropy and the integral over a potential)
will encode changes, when the set of feedback operators decides simultaneously to change their strategies
toward attaining the game-theoretic equilibrium (cf. Rosenthal [15] although in a different way than in the
present paper).
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Definition 2 We shall say that the feedback operators (K∗1, K∗2, . . . , K∗N ) ∈ K are the
game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators, if they produce control responses given by
u
∗
j (t) =
(K∗jx)(t) ∈ Uj , ∀j ∈ N , (13)
for t ∈ [0,∞] and satisfy the following conditions
Pϕ
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
≤ sup
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)∈K
sup
ν∈MΦt
(
X
)
{
hν
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
ϕdν
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Pϕ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
, ∀t ≥ 0.
(14)
where the outer supremum in the above equation is determined with respect to Kj for each
j ∈ N ; while the others K∗¬j remain fixed.4
Remark 4 Note that the inner supremum is over all Φ(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t - invariant Borel probability
measures on X . Further, if there exist game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators, then
this implies that the set of equilibrium states for X , i.e.,
Eϕ
(
X
)
=
⋂
t≥0
{
µ ∈ MΦt
∣∣∣Pϕ(Φ(K∗j ,K∗¬j)t ) = hµ(Φ(K∗j ,K∗¬j)t )+
∫
X
ϕdµ
}
,
is non-empty with respect to
{
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
}
t≥0
and ϕ ∈ C(X,R).
Remark 5 We remark that, for ϕ = 0, the entropy that corresponds to P0
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
is
equal to the topological entropy htop
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
) (e.g., see Adler et al. [1] or Walters [20]).
Then, we formally state the main objective of this paper.
Problem: For a given potential function ϕ ∈ C(X,R), provide a sufficient condition on
the existence of game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators
(K∗1, K∗2, . . . , K∗N) ∈ K
that guarantee maximum entropy of equilibrium states for the measurable transformation
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t for all t ≥ 0.
4 Note that, in Equation (14), the computational effort is performed with respect to Kj for each j ∈ N ,
while the others K∗¬j remain fixed. Then, the following is more appropriate (in the sense of set inclusion)
K∗j ∈ arg sup
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)∈K

 sup
ν∈MΦt
(
X
)
{
hν
(
Φ
(Kj ,K
∗
¬j)
t
)
+
∫
X
ϕdν
}
 , ∀t ≥ 0,
(e.g., see Aubin [2] for such notions arising in nonlinear analysis).
On the entropy of equilibrium measures and game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators 7
3.2 Existence of game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators
In the following, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium state
that is associated with an equilibrium measure (i.e., a common limit point) for the family of
operators
{
L(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t)
}
t≥0
, for each j ∈ N , i.e.,
{(
L(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺
)
(x)
}
t≥0
=


∫(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
−1
(x)
exp
(
ϕ(y)
)
̺(y)dν


t≥0
,
∀ν ∈ MΦt
(
X
)
, (15)
where ̺(x) is any measurable function from the space of all possible real-valued measurable
functions on X satisfying
∫
X
|̺(x)|dν <∞.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the family of linear operators
{
L(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t)
}
t≥0
in Equation (15)
satisfies the following⋂
j∈N
⋂
t≥0
(
L(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺
)
(x) 6= ∅, ∀(Kj , K∗¬j) ∈ K , (16)
for a given potential ϕ ∈ C(X,R).
Then, there exist game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators (K∗1, K∗2, . . . , K∗N ) ∈ K ,
if the following hold
Pϕ
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
≤ Pϕ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
, ∀t ≥ 0. (17)
and
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺→ µ as t→∞. (18)
where µ ∈ Eϕ
(
X
) ⊂MΦt(X) is an equilibrium state that satisfies
Pϕ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
= hµ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
ϕdµ, ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof Note that if Eϕ
(
X
)
is non-empty, then Equation (16) holds true for all (Kj , K∗¬j) ∈
K . Let
µ ∈
⋂
j∈N
⋂
t≥0
{
ν ∈ MΦt
(
X
) ∣∣∣hν(Φ(Kj,K∗¬j)t )+
∫
X
ϕdν > Pϕ
(
Φ
(Kj ,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
− 1
n
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Iϕ
(
X
)
.
and noticing that Eϕ
(
X
) ⊂ Iϕ(X) (cf. Remark 4), then there exists a family of invariant
measures
{
νn
}
n≥1
, νn ∈ MΦt
(
X
)
, such that
νn → µ as n→∞,
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and for all t ≥ 0
sup
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)∈K
{
hνn
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
ϕdνn
}
→ sup
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)∈K
Pϕ
(
Φ
(Kj,K
∗
¬j
)
t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Pϕ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
,
which corresponds to the equilibrium state, when the feedback operators attain the game-
theoretic equilibrium, i.e., (K∗j , K∗¬j) ∈ K .5
Then, we have
Pϕ+ϕ˜
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
− Pϕ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
≥ hνn
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
(ϕ+ ϕ˜)dνn
− Pϕ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
→
∫
X
ϕ˜dµ, ∀ϕ˜ ∈ C(X,R).
as n→∞. Hence, we have µ ∈ Eϕ
(
X
)
.
Now suppose that there exist µ ∈MΦt
(
X
)\Iϕ(X) and (K∗j , K∗¬j) ∈ K such that Equa-
tion (17) holds. Notice that Iϕ
(
X
)
is compact in the weak topology. Then, using the sepa-
ration theorem (e.g., see [7, pp 417]), we have∫
X
ϕ˜dµ > sup
{∫
X
ϕ˜dν
∣∣∣ ν ∈ Iϕ(X)} ,
for some ϕ˜ ∈ C(X,R) which is bounded from above and below.
Next, for each n ≥ 1, if we choose νn such that
hνn
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
(
ϕ+
ϕ˜
n
)
dνn > Pϕ+ ϕ˜
n
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
− 1
n2
.
Then, we have∫
X
ϕ˜dµ = n
∫
X
ϕ˜
n
dµ ≤ n
[
P
ϕ+ ϕ˜
n
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
− Pϕ
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)]
≤ n
[
hνn
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
(
ϕ+
ϕ˜
n
)
dνn − hνn
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
−
∫
X
ϕdνn +
1
n2
]
=
∫
X
ϕ˜dνn +
1
n
.
From the above equation, if µ˜ is a common limit point of
{
νn
}
n≥1
, then
∫
X
ϕ˜dµ ≤∫
X
ϕ˜dµ˜. But, this is a contradiction, since µ˜ ∈ Iϕ
(
X
)
follows from
hνn
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
+
∫
X
ϕdνn > Pϕ+ ϕ˜
n
(
Φ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t
)
−
∫
X
ϕ˜
n
dνn − 1
n2
.
Hence, we easily see that µ ∈ Eϕ
(
X
)
is the equilibrium measure, which corresponds to
the game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators (K∗j , K∗¬j) ∈ K (i.e., the statement in
Equation (17) hold true for all t ≥ 0). On the other hand, if µ ∈ Eϕ
(
X
) (i.e., the equilibrium
5 Here, we implicitly assume that there exists at least one common limit point of equilibrium state.
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measure), then there exists a measurable function ̺(x) (from a suitable function space on
X) such that
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺ ∈ Eϕ
(
X
)
, ∀t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺→ µ.
This completes the proof. ✷
Remark 6 The last two equations state that, for any t ≥ 0 and starting from any initial
state, the best response path will always lead to the game-theoretic equilibrium feedback
operators.
3.3 Resilient behavior of game-theoretic equilibrium feedback operators
In this subsection, we consider the following system with a small random perturbation
term
dZ
ǫ(t) =
(
A(t) +
∑
j∈N
Bj(t)K∗j (t)
)
Z
ǫ(t)dt+
√
ǫ σ(Zǫ(t))dW (t), Zǫ(0) = x0,
(19)
where σ(Zǫ(t)) ∈ Rd×d is a diffusion term, W (t) is a d-dimensional Wiener process
and ǫ is a small positive number, which represents the level of perturbation in the system.
Note that we assume here there exist equilibrium feedback operators
(K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗N) ∈
K , when ǫ = 0 (which corresponds to the unperturbed multi-channel dynamical system).
Then, we investigate, as ǫ→ 0, the asymptotic stability behavior of an equilibrium measure
for the family of linear operators
{
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t)
}
t≥0
that corresponds to the multi-channel
dynamical system with a small random perturbation.
Remark 7 We remark that such a solution for Equation (19) is assumed to have continuous
sample paths with probability one (e.g., see Kunita [12]).
Next, we present the following proposition, which is concerned with the resilient behavior
of the equilibrium feedback operators – when there is a small random perturbation in the
system.
Proposition 3 For ǫ > 0 and any measurable function ̺(x), if the family of linear opera-
tors
{
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t)
}
t≥0
satisfies the following relative entropy condition with respect to the
unperturbed dynamical system
R
(
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
∥∥∥L(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕ, t) ̺) =
∫
X
log

dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺

 dL(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕǫ, t) ̺
≤ ρ(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ǫ, t) , L
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺≪ L
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺, ∀t ≥ 0,
(20)
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where ρ(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ǫ, t) is the entropy gap, which is a positive quantity (that depends on ǫ and also
tends to zero as ǫ→ 0).
Then, the equilibrium feedback operators (K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗N) ∈ K exhibit a resilient be-
havior.6
Proof Suppose that the set of feedback operators (K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗N) ∈ K satisfies Propo-
sition 2. Then, for each ǫ ≥ 0 that is sufficiently small, the following lower bound condition
holds7
1
2
∥∥∥dL(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕǫ, t) ̺− dL(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕ, t) ̺∥∥∥2
L1
≤ R
(
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
∥∥∥L(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕ, t) ̺), ∀t ≥ 0.
On the other hand, suppose that supp dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺(x) ⊂ supp dL
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
t ̺(x), ∀t ≥ 0
and ∀x ∈ X . Then, we have
R
(
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
∥∥∥L(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕ, t) ̺)
=
∫
X
log

dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺

 dL(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕǫ, t) ̺,
≤
∫
X

dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺

(dL(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕǫ, t) ̺− dL(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕ, t) ̺) dL(K∗j ,K∗¬j)(ϕǫ, t) ̺,
≤
∫
X
1
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺
((
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
)2
−
(
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺
)2)
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺,
≤ 1
µ
(
X
) ∫
X
((
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
)2
−
(
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺
)2)
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺.
Note that both measurable functions L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺ and L
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺ lie in the L
1 space for
each t ≥ 0. Hence, the above last expression is bounded from above by a constant (which
also depends implicitly on the perturbation level ǫ ≥ 0). Further, if we let
ρ
(K∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ǫ, t) = inft≥0
1
µ
(
X
) ∫
X
((
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺
)2
−
(
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕ, t) ̺
)2)
dL(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺.
Then, we see that Equation (20) holds – where such a statement evidently establishes the
resilient behavior of the equilibrium feedback operators
(K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗N) ∈ K , when
there is a random perturbation in the system. This completes the proof. ✷
The above proposition states that the equilibrium feedback operators exhibit a resilient be-
havior, when the contribution of the random perturbation term, to move away the system
from the equilibrium measure µ, is bounded from above for all t ≥ 0.8
6 Note that ̺(x) is assumed to satisfy
∫
X
̺(x)dν <∞ (cf. Equation (15)).
7 We remark that such a lower bound on the relative entropy between two measurable functions from the
L1 space was originally proved by Csisza´r [6].
8 Heuristically, ρ
(K∗j ,K
∗
¬j)
(ǫ, t)
, for t ≥ 0, is the amount of entropy which is attributed due to the presence of
random perturbations in the system.
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We also note that the following holds
lim
t→∞
L(K
∗
j
,K∗
¬j
)
(ϕǫ, t) ̺→ µ as ǫ→ 0. (21)
Therefore, such a statement in Equation (20) is an immediate consequence of this fact (e.g.,
see Kifer [9] on the convergence of equilibrium measures for dynamical systems with small
random perturbations, in the sense of deterministic limit).
Remark 8 Although we have not discussed the limiting behavior, as ǫ → 0, in Equa-
tion (21), it appears that the theory of large deviations can be used to estimate the rate
at which this family of measures converges to a unique equilibrium measure (e.g., see also
[21], [19] or [10] for background information).
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